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be measured by another standard not under the control of the
state and which may be subject to change, does not amount to
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. [ Citations.] "
(See, also, Paler-mo v. Stockton Theatr-es, Inc.
(1948), snpr-a, 32 Cal.2d 53, 59.)
I agree that the United Nations Charter, as presently constituted and accepted was not intended to, and does not,
supersede existing domestic legislation of the United States
or of the several states and territories.
I would hold that provisions of the Alien Land Law here
invoked by the State of California do not contravene either
the federal or state Constitutions; and would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Shenk, J., and Spence, J., concurred.

[Sac. No. 6170.

In Bank.

Apr. 17, 1952.]

HAROLD A. KLETT, Appellant, v. SECURITY ACCEPTANCE COMPANY (a Corporation) et al., Respondents.
[1] Interest-Usury-Evidence.-Defendant's testimony that he

told plaintiff he would charge him 1 per cent a month for
the privilege of having his furniture in plaintiff's store, and
plaintiff's testimony that he was to pay defendant such charge
for the "privilege of having that . . . flooring," together with
references in plaintiff's testimony to his "ten per cent equity"
in the furniture as to which defendant finance company was
advancing 90 per cent of the wholesale price, support an
implied finding of the jury that the 1 per cent charge was
intended by the parties not as interest but as compensation
for the arrangement under which plaintiff, without substantial capital or credit, was enabled to start and carry on a
furniture business.
[2] !d.-Usury-Transactions Embraced-Sales Contracts.-Sales
of conditional sales contracts between plaintiff and his retail
customers to defendant finance company at discounts of about
[2] See Cal.Jur., Interest, § 10; Am.Jur., Interest, § 21.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Interest, § 44; [2] Interest, § 31;
[3] Evidence, §116; [4, 7, 9] Interest, §40; [5, 8, 11] Interest,
§ 45; [6] Trust Receipts; [10] Interest,§ 31.1; [12] Trover, § 6;
[13] Pawn and Personal Property Brokers,§ 6; [14] Trover,§ 39;
[15] Appeal and Error, § 1524-1.
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[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

17 per cent, while part of a usurious scheme if made for the
sole purpose of evading the usury laws by giving the finance
company a usurious profit on its loans to plaintiff, are not part
of such a scheme where they are bona fide sales of property,
are without recourse against plaintiff or his partner, and are
transactions made at plaintiff's request.
Evidence-Presumptions-Value.-Since it is a matter of
common knowledge that many retailers customarily discount
conditional sales contracts and many finance companies purchase them, there is no presumption that the market value of
tho~e contracts was their face value.
Interest-Usury-Instructions.-A formula instruction that
"if you find that the relationship existing between plaintiff
and defendants herein was that of borrower and lender, insofar
as the transactions occurring between the plaintiff and
defendants evidenced by trust receipts are concerned, and you
find that said transactions were in fact loans of money, and
you further find that as a condition of making such loans the
defendants required the plaintiff to sell to said defendants at
less than their reasonable, fair market value time contracts
covering the sale of furniture by plaintiff to plaintiff's customers, then you must find that . . . the amount under the
reasonable, fair market value that each time contract was discounted is to he considered interest" is properly refused, for
the mere fact that a borrower may have been required to enter
into an unprofitable contract as a condition to a loan of money
would not itself make the loan usurious.
!d.-Usury-Appeal-Harmless Error.-Any error in not
allowing plaintiff to prove the fair market value of conditional
sales contracts which he sold to defendant finance company
at discounts of about 17 per cent is not prejudicial to plaintiff
where the jury impliedly found on ample evidence and sufficient instructions that defendants did not require the sale of
the contracts as a condition of making loans to plaintiff.
Trust Receipts--Nature.--Trust receipts are a method of
securing a debt and not of creating a debt; there can be no
such thing as a security intPrest which secures no obligation.
Interest-Usury-Instructions.-In an action to recover usurious interest alleged to havP been paid in connection with a
series of loans, instructions are erroneous which imply that
trust receipt transactions and loans are, respectively, inherently and necessarily exclusive of each other and which advise
the jury that "If the transactions . . . were trust receipt

[6] Sec Cal.Jur., Trust Receipts, § 3; Am.Jur., Trust Receipts,
§ 2.
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transactions and not loans, then the question of interest is
not involved."
[8] !d.-Usury-Appeal-Harmless Error.-Plaintiff suing to recover usurious interest is not prejudiced by instructions which
erroneously assume that a trust receipt transaction and a
usurious loan are mutually exclusive concepts where such
instructions were conditioned on the jury's finding that the
trust receipt transactions in question were bona fide and to
secure the flooring of furniture in plaintiff's store and not
to conceal or secure any hidden agreement for the mere payment of interest; and where the other instructions given make
it clear that the ultimate issue actmilly to be decided was not
whether the transactions were trust receipts or loans, but
whether the loans, or the transactions by whatever name they
might be called, were or were not usurious.
[9] Id.-Usury-Instructions.-In an action to recover usurious
interest alleged to have been paid in connection with a series
of loans, it is proper to give an instruction, at defendants'
request, that a lender is not prohibited from charging an extra
and reasonable amount for incidental services, expenses or
risk additional to the lawful interest, other than for the loan
of money; that he may make a reasonable charge for investigating, negotiating, brokering, making, servicing, collecting
and enforcing· his obligation; and that such items must be
confined to specific service or expense incidental to the loan
incurred in such a way as to preclude its being a device through
which additional interest or profit on the loan may be exacted.
[10] Id.- Usury- Exemptions.- Legitimate charges for specific
items of actual service and expense are not compensation for
the loan of money within the meaning of the usury law ( Const.,
art. XX, § 22) ; such charges are not interest.
[11] !d.-Usury-Appeal-Harmless Error.-In an action to recover usurious interest alleged to have been paid in connection
with a series of loans, admission in evidence, over plaintiff's
objection, of statement of trust receipt financing which may
be filed by an en truster with the Secretary of State ( Civ.
Code, § 3016.9) is not prejudicial to plaintiff where such statement is merely some evidence that defendant finance company
intended to loan money to plaintiff on the security of trust
receipts, and he himself pro_ved the fact.
[12] Trover-What Constitutes Conversion.--Taking of personal
property is not a conversion where such act is done with the
consent of the complaining party.
[13] Pawn and Personal Property Brokers-Statutes Governing.Personal Property Brokers Act (Stats. 1909, p. 969, as
amended) does not apply to bona fide conditional sales contracts or "flooring contracts."
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[14] Trover-Appeal-Harmless Error.-On appeal from a judgment for defendants in an action for conversion of furniture,
plaintiff may not complain of the rejection of evidence offered
by him to prove the extent of his damages where the jury
found against him on the issue of liability and did not reach
the issue of damages.
[15] Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Jury-Deliberation.-lVIere fact that jury returned to court after 25 minutes'
deliberation with a signed separate verdict on each of two
counts does not show that there has been a miscarriage of
justice. ( Const., art. VI, § 4lj2.)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County. Malcolm C. Glenn, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for recovery of usurious interest and penalties, and
for conversion of furniture. Judgment for defendants affirmed.
Horace E. Dunning for Appellant.
-Wilke & Fleury, H. Nelson French, Sherman C. Wilke
and Gordon A. Fleury for Respondents.
SCHAUER, J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment, entered
pursuant to a jury verdict for defendants, in this action for
the recovery of usurious interest and penalties and for the
conversion of certain furniture. 'vVe have concluded that no
prejudicial error or miscarriage of justice is shown and that,
in accord with the mandate of section 4¥2 of article VI of
the state Constitution, the judgment should be affirmed. Because, however, there was errm: in instructing the jury, it is
necessary to quote, or to epitomize in some detail, a substantial
amount of the evidence to show that the error was not prejudicial.
Some of the testimony of plaintiff, such as that in reference
to the circumstances of his meeting Mr. Parker and the events
immediately preceding his dealings with defendants, scarcely
seems material to either cause of action but since plaintiff evidently thought that these matters were important and the
jury heard them from plaintiff's lips, mention of them is made.
The jury may have felt that the evidence threw some light on
plaintiff's circumstances, his business methods, and the nature of his dealings with defendants.
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---------------------------------------The Usury Canse of .Action

Plaintiti, in November, 1945, was a furniture salesman
employed by the Standard .F'urniture Company in Sacramento; he decided that he wished to go into the furniture
business on his own account. He had met a Mr. Parker,
''the first time the day I came from Stockton to the Sacramento Alcoholics Anonymous Club, and we became friends
through our work together, and in that philosophy we follow
in Alcoholics Anonymous.'' Mr. Parker ''used to come to the
store" where plaintiff was employed; further, according to
plaintiff's testimony, Mr. Parker said "he would like to go
into the furniture business with me here. This conversation
possibly went on for two or three months.'' Plaintiff and
Mr. Parker then, on November 13, 1945, orally agreed to form
a partnership and on that date plaintiff left his employment
with the Standard :B~urniture Company. Plaintiff testified,
"I told Mr. Parker that I was unable to go into business
as far as finances were concerned . . . I said, 'I will consider
going in business with yon if you will put up the money
against my experience . . . ' . . . At that time he said he
would arrange for twenty five hundred dollars, and not very
long after he would have twenty five hundred dollars more.
I said, 'It would be useless to go in for less than five thousand
dollars at this time.' " On November 29, 1945, Mr. Parker
"put up one thousand dollars" and on December 4, five
hundred dollars. Parker advanced no more money. In the
meantime, plaintiff testified, he expected a Dr. Leiser to purchase a storeroom and rent it to plaintiff; on the strength of
his expectations of getting a location and the capital which
Mr. Parker had promised, plaintiff made buying trips to San
:B'rancisco and Los Angeles and purchased several thousand
dollars worth of furniture ; he also purchased a used automobile.
Plaintiff testified, ''there wasn't any use in trying to establish a credit. . . . I told the manufacturers we would pay
for this merchandise when it was delivered, or before it was
delivered . . . I was to notify them for future delivery."
After the first $1,000 was advanced by Parker, plaintiff paid
for some of the furniture he had ordered, paid $150 for a
sales tax bond, and paid for the used automobile.
Plaintiff then discovered that Dr. I~eiser had not purchased
the building which he (plaintiff) had expected Dr. Leiser
to purchase and lease to the new partnership, and, having
no storeroom, plaintiff caused the furniture he had purchased
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to be placed in storage with Western Van & Storage Company. He then noticed (about December 2, 1945) that a
building near the one which he had expected Dr. Leiser to
purchase appeared to be empty; plaintiff contacted the owner,
who at first was not interested in plaintiff as a tenant; however, although the owner would not enter into a lease he
finally agreed to permit the new partnership to rent the building on a month to month basis on condition, suggested by
plaintiff, that the latter ''would give his son a position.''
Upon this agreement plaintiff caused the stored furniture to
be moved into the rented building on or about December 4 or 5.
Mr. Parker put up the $500 above mentioned on December 4
and this sum went for "payment of rent and telephone
fleposits, gas and electricity deposits, and the general conduct
of the business, and repairs. We had to put a floor in our
store.''
Plaintiff repeatedly asked Mr. Parker for more money but
Mr. Parker said it vvas not available. On December 4, 1945, at
plaintiff's request, defendant Kenneth Forrest, vice-president
of defendant finance company, met plaintiff at the latter's
home. Plaintiff, while an employe of Standard, had seen Mr.
Forrest in the Standard store. Concerning their meeting on
December 4, plaintiff testified, ''I told him . . . that I was
having difficulty and that difficulty was in getting enough
capital to start this business. And I told him that Raymond
Parker and I had agreed to go in business; and I told him
it didn't look like I was going to get very far on this new
store without some financial assistance.
''I ash:ed him if his company would be interested in any
way in helping me finance this business. . . . vV e discussed
fnrnitnre contracts, and the sale of furniture. And I told him
that if he wonld help me at this time, in this way of financingor flooring, 1 that I wonld be able to give him a good deal of
onr sales contract bnsiness. 2 • • • And we dwelled a great
(I eal on the plan we had been llsing [?] If he decided to do
so, how we wonld sell onr furniture contracts to him and his
1
The term ''flooring,'' as it is used in this case, was explained to
the .jury in the following instruction (given at plaintiff's request) :
"Merchnndise is 'floored' when it is financed under a trust receipt or
simila.r title retention document, whereby a retail dealer obtains possession of tl1e same from a distrihutor for exhibition and sale through
payment to f1istrilmtor by a hank or other financing agency.''
2
The "sales contract business" referred to by plarntiff is the
sale at a discount of conditional sales contracts between plaintiff and
his retail customers.
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firm
And before he left my home he told me that he
would go along with us after knowing the structure that we
had at this time to the extent of five thousand dollars; and
that I would have to floor, or finance with them only the major
pieces of furniture. The smaller items he would not be interested in because it would be hard to keep track of. . . . He
said 'I will go along to five thousand dollars worth of flooring
or financing.' ''
Plaintiff and Kenneth Forrest arranged a meeting on December 5 with Kenneth's father, president of defendant finance company, and plaintiff's partner, Parker. At this
meeting, plaintiff testified, the elder Mr. Forrest "told me
that they would put 90 per cent into these purchases and
that we would pay one per cent a month on the flooring,
and that this merchandise would be paid off individually
from these trust receipts 3 that I signed later as we sold the
merchandise and delivered it . . . . If the merchandise was
on the floor for a period of thirty days we were to pay him
one per cent a month for that privilege of having that, or
whatever you want to call it, that flooring; but had the
merchandise been sold before that time-for example, i:f merchandise would come in on the first of the month, and we
sold it on the fifth of the month, we were also instructed that
we were to pay one per cent at that time."
It is apparent from plaintiff's testimony as above quoted
that he was asking for, and received, something more than a
mere loan of money or credit for interest. He admitted that
he had no credit and that it would be useless for him to try
to establish credit. He was asking the defendants to finance
his business; to do almost the very thing, short of becoming
a partner, which Parker had agreed to do but had failed to
do. He was asking defendants, in effect, to purchase for cash
from manufacturers the major items of furniture which were
to constitute his stock in trade; to pay 90 per cent of the cost
thereof while plaintiff advanced only 10 per cent of such cost;
to keep an inventory of each item of furniture so stocked;
to permit plaintiff to have possession of such furniture, to
display it on his salesroom floor and, ordinarily at least. not
to expect to be repaid for his advances or his costs of doing
business until and unless the furniture items were sold to
retail purchasers; "we were to pay him [defendants] one per
cent a month for that privilege of having that, or whatever
you want to call it, that flooring."
"The form of the "trust receipts" is hereinafter quoted in footnote 4.
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As indicated above it was agreed that defendant finance
company would advance 90 per cent of the wholesale price
of furniture selected by plaintiff for purchase, in a total
amount not to exceed $5,000 (later increased to $7,500), that
plaintiff would pay the remaining 10 per cent of the purchase
price, and that title would be vested in defendants but possession for purposes of display on the salesroom floor would be
in plaintiff. Pursuant to this arrangement plaintiff obtained
from defendant finance company a series of loans. On the
occasion of each loan plaintiff executed to the finance company a document entitled ''trust receipt.' ' 4 These documents
evidence a security interest of the finance company in furniture which is described therein and which plaintiff, by virtue
of the arrangement, put in his store, exhibited, and sold or
attempted to sell to retail customers. The finance company
made a monthly charge of one per cent of the face amount of
each ''trust receipt.'' .Also, during the period of the dealings
between the parties, plaintiff, pursuant to the previously mentioned oral arrangement with Forrest, sold conditional sales
contracts between plaintiff and his retail customers to the
finance company, at discounts which amounted to about 17
per cent of the face value of the contracts; the sales of these
contracts were without recourse by the finance company
against plaintiff.
'Such documents read in material part as follows: "TRUST RECEIPT
. . . [Plaintiff] as Trustee holds in trust for SECURITY AccEPTANCE Co.,
Entruster, as security for payment of the amount hereinafter set forth
on the due date hereinafter specified, and all other obligations of Trustee
to Entruster whether heretofore or hereafter incurred, the following
personal property: [description 1 . . . in which personal property a
security interest remains in or is hereby transferred to Entruster as
security for such payment. Trustee agrees to hold said personal property
in trust as the property of Entruster for the purpose of sale or exchange
and to deliver same to the Entruster upon demand. Entruster may at
any time ... either before or after the due date repossess said personal
property without notice or demand of any kind and for such purpose
Entruster or his representatives may without legal process enter any
premises in which said personal property is located. . . .
'' . . . The Trustee may . . . sell said personal property for cash or
on terms approved in advance by Entruster for not less than the amount
due En truster hereunder . . . ; provided, however, that upon such sale
all moneys hereby secured shall become immediately due and payable
and all of the proceeds and considerations received in such sale shall
be forthwith delivered to Entruster as security for payment of said
moneys and until so delivered shall be held by the Trustee separate
from the funds of the Trustee and as security for such payment.
"In event of the repossession of the said personal property the Entruster may on or after default give notice to the Trustee of intention to
sell and may at any time not less than five (5) days after the giving
of such notice sell said personal property at public or private sale, with
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Plaintiff has discussed at great length the elements of a
trust receipt relationship before and after enactment of the
California version of the Uniform Trust Receipts Law ( Civ.
Code, §§ 3012-3016.16) and has argued at great length that
the elements of the relationship described in that law were not
present in the various ''trust receipt'' transactions here. 5
Plaintiff's arguments in this regard concern aspects of the
trust receipt transactions which would be relevant only if
rights of third parties (e.g., persons with prior liens on the
furniture) were involved. Since it is undisputed that the
transactions resulted in some ~ort of security interest in the
finance company and since the· name of the type of interest is
immaterial, it is unnecessary to describe in detail the manner
in which these various transactions were handled or to construe with particularity the Uniform Trust Receipts Law in
its exact application to each transaction. F'or convenience of
discussion the documents entitled "trust receipts" will be so
referred to, but from this reference no implication that we are
passing upon the law of trust receipts in relation to possible
intervening rights of third persons is to be drawn. Our concern here is not whether the requirements of the Uniform Trust
Receipts Law were met in all respects, but whether the jury's
or without notice and without any further notice or demand to the Trustee
and without having said personal property at the place of sale, and may
at any public sale itself become a purchaser. The proceeds of any such
sale shall he applied, first, to payment of the expenses thereof; second,
to payment of the expc11se of retaking, keeping and storing said personal property . . . ; third, to the satisfaction of the Trustee's indebtedness hereby secured; and, fourth, to the payment of any other obligation
owed by 'rrustee to Entruster. The Trustee shall receive any surplus
and shall pay unto Entruster upon demand any deficiency.
"Notice of intention to sell shall be deemed sufficiently given when
in writing and either pm·sonally served on the Trustee or when deposited
in the United States mail postage prepaid addressed to the Tmstee 's
last known business address.
''In the event of default by the Trustee in the payment of any
moneys hereunder due on the due date hereof, Entruster may declare
all moneys secured immediately due and payable. In event of such
default Entruster may at his option and in lieu of sale as hereinabove
provided declare a forfeiture of the Trustee's interest in said personal
property against cancellation of the then remaining indebtedness in
accordance with the provisions of Section 3016.2 of the Civil Code of the
State of California.
"No waiver of any existing default shall be deemed to waive any
subsequent default and all rig·hts hereunder are cumulative and not
alternative.''
5
From his opening statement on throughout the trial, except perhaps
in connection with his motion for a directed verdict, plaintiff argued
that the transactions evidenced by the trust receipt documents were
''not trust receipts transactions'' but were ''mere loans.'' The error
of this position, which was adopted by the trial court, is discussed later.
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verdict that usury was not committed and that defendants
did not convert plaintiff's property can properly be sustained.
Plaintiff urges that as a matter of law the one per cent
per month charges were interest at a rate in excess of that
permitted by section 22 of article XX of the state Constitution.6 The controlling issue, however, as to this element of
the case, is whether the monthly charges were exclusively
for the forbearance of money or were for other services either
wholly or at least in such part as to leave the amount paid as
interest, if any, within a legal rate. This presents a question
of fact and the evidence on it is conflicting but the issue does
not appear to be a close one. Plaintiff's own testimony conflicts within itself; in significant parts, however, it corroborates
the testimony of defendant Kenneth Forrest (the only defendant who testified).
[1] Plaintiff in his testimony variously described the
charges as "for the privilege of having that . . . flooring"
and as ''interest.'' Forrest testified that in their preliminary
negotiations "I mentioned the fact to Mr. Klett that I would
charge him 1 per cent a month charges on flooring of merchandise.'' Forrest further testified, '' Q. What was that 1
per cent for, Mr. Forrest q A. The charge of enabling him
to have our furniture in his store and other consideration.
(~. \Vould that be for, let us say, ·wTiting up the trust receipt
and handling the invoice and such as that~ A. Yes, sir, that
would include writing up the trust receipt, the bookkeeper's
time, making up a ledger card and putting it in the books
and making up the addressograph plate to enable us to send
the notice, and the notices themselves and the mail. . . .
Q. And for the use of that money you made a charge of 1 per
cent, is that correct? A. For the privilege of his having my
furniture in his store I charged him 1 per cent a month.''
Plaintiff himself testified, it will be remembered, that "we
were to pay him [Forrest] one per cent a month for that
privilege of having that . . . flooring.'' Further tending to
support the implied finding of the jury that the one per cent
charge vms intended by the parties not as interest but as
compensation for the arrangement under which plaintiff, without substantial capital or credit, was enabled to start and
<"arry on a business and to that end was allowed to select for
"Cal. Con st., art. XX, § 22: "The rate of interest upon the loan or
forbearance of any money . . . shall be seven per cent per annum
hut it shall be competent :for the parties to any loan . . . to contract
in writing for a rate of interest not exceeding ten per cent per annum.''
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purchase, purchase, and display the furniture in his store,
are plaintiff's references in his testimony to his ''ten per cent
equity" in the furniture as to which the finance company was
advancing 90 per cent of the wholesale price. 7
[2] Plaintiff further urges that as a matter of law the
sales of his conditional sales contracts to the finance company
at discounts of about 17 per cent were made under a scheme
which secured to the finance company a collateral advantage
and which was made for the sole purpose of evading the usury
laws by giving the finance company a usurious profit on the
loans. Such a scheme is usurious. (Terry Trading Corp. v.
Barsky (1930), 210 Cal. 428, 432 [292 P. 474].) But there
is ample evidence to support the implied finding of the jury
that the discount sales of the conditional sales contracts were
bona fide sales of property, were without recourse as against
plaintiff or his partner, and were transactions made at plaintiff's request, and not part of a usurious scheme. (Of. Milana
v. Credit Discounting Co. (1945), 27 Cal.2d 335, 340 [163
P.2d 869, 165 A.L.R. 621].)
[3] In connection with his argument that he was forced
to sell his conditional sales contracts unprofitably plaintiff (citing 65 C.J., p. 101, § 177, and 22 C.J., p. 104, § 46) says that
there is a presumption that the market value of those contracts
was their face value. Since it is a matter of common knowledge
that many retailers customarily discount such contracts and
many finance companies purchase them, we cannot agree that
there is any such presumption.
Plaintiff asserts that even if the evidence does not show as
a matter of law that the discounting of the contracts was a
device to evade the usury laws, certain rulings of the trial
court prevented him from properly presenting the question
to the jury as one of fact. [4] He complains of the trial
court's refusal to give the following formula instruction
(requested by plaintiff): "if you find that the relationship
existing between plaintiff and defendants herein was that of
borrower and lender, insofar as the transactions occurring
between the plaintiff and defendants evidenced by trust receipts are concerned, and you find that said transactions were

•we also note that plaintiff's original complaint does not seek recovery of usurious interest and penalties, but only seeks damages for
conversion. This might be considered as tending to show that his
claim that the charges were usurious interest was but an afterthought,
prompted by litigation.
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in fact loans of money, 8 and you further find that as a condition of making such loans the defendants required the
plaintiff to sell to said defendants at less than their reasonable, fair market value time contracts covering the sale of
furniture by plaintiff to plaintiff's customers, then you must
find that for the purposes of this action the amount under
the reasonable, fair market value that each time contract was
discounted is to be considered interest.'' The instruction
was properly refused, for "the mere fact that . . . [a borrower] may have been required to enter into an unprofitable
contract as a condition to a loan of money would not itself
make the loan usurious." (Terry Trading Corp. v. Barsky
(1930), supm, 210 Cal. 428, 432.) Furthermore, as will
8
Here again, plaintiff suggests the erroneous view that trust receipt
transactions and loans are mutually exclusive of each other.
In his opening statement plaintiff's counsel said, ''Now, Mr. Klett
. . . maintains throughout and has alleged in his complaint, that the
transaction as carried on between himself and the defendant here was
nothing more nor less than a loan of money. That is going to be
one of the principal things that you folks are going to have to be looking
for as the evidence develops . . . Now . . . the defendant . . . will
claim that the transaction . . . between my client and themselves did not
result in a loan of money, but that it was something else.
" We will show that . . . Mr. Klett signed certain instruments . . •
entitled 'Trust Receipts' and they were furnished by the defendant . . .
We will also show . . . and prove, that these transactions were nothing
more nor less than a loan of money, and that the defendant, for that
loan of money, charged a mte of interest which we will prove to you is
in excess of the amount that was permitted . . . under the laws of this
state . . . Now, it is going to be up to you . . . to determine what the
transaction was.''
Again, in introducing in evidence the documents denominated ''trust
receipts'' plaintiff's counsel insisted on the view that bona fide trust
receipt transactions and loans of money were mutually exclusive of each
other. The record shows: "MR. DuNNING [plaintiff's counsel] : I am
introducing the instruments but, I want it understood that I am not
introducing the instruments for the purpose of showing that they are
trust receipts. THE CouR'l': You are introducing them but you claim they
are not trust receipts? A. I claim they are not trust receipts, yes. THE
CouRT: All right, you can put them in for that limited purpose. MR.
DuNNING: In other words, I want it understood I am putting them
in for the limited purpose and not for the purpose of establishing that
they are trust receipts but for the purpose of showing the amount owing,
if any, on December 27, 1946, from the plaintiff to the defendants and
for the purpose of showing that the defendants had a security interest
in the merchandise which is listed on these instruments entitled 'Trust
Receipts.' MR. BEDEAU [defendants' counsel] : Aren't they going in
for all pmposes regardless of whether you call them chattel mortgages
or trust receipts? THE CouRT': No, he isn't introducing them-I don't
understand myself about the security interest-but he wants to limit it
for the two purposes and I guess that is all right.''
The above quoted statements of position by counsel for plaintiff are
referred to infra, p. 782, in connection with an instruction given by the
court which erroneously adopts the position taken by plaintiff.
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appear more in detail from instructions hereinafter quoted,
the jury were properly instructed that ''all the circumstances
[and dealings of the parties] must be inquired into to determine whether . . . there was a usurious charge of interest.''
[5] Plaintiff further complains that he was not allowed
to prove the fair market value of the conditional sales contracts because, when he asked Forrest, on cross-examination
and with no offer of proof or statement of purpose, whether
the 17 per cent discount was ''about the prevailing rate of
discount,'' defendants' objection to the question ·was sustained. If we assume that the question was designed to elicit
evidence of the fair market value of conditional sales contracts, and that it was proper on cross-examination of ·defendant Forrest after plaintiff had rested his ease on direct examination, the sustaining of the objection thereto nevertheless
could not have prejudiced plaintiff because, as previously
stated, the jury impliedly found upon ample evidence and
sufficient instructions that defendants did not require the sale
of the contracts as a condition of making the loans. In this
connection the jury were told, among other things, that
"where different transactions have been entered into and these
different transactions are relied upon in making a charge of
usury all the circumstances must be inquired into to determine whether or not such collateral agreement or separate
agreement was intended to be and was a part of another agreement, and considering the two together there was a usurious
charge of interest." (See also further instructions quoted
infra, pp. 786-787.)
As hereinabove mentioned, the court apparently accepted
the view of the law suggested in plaintiff's opening statement
and offer of proof as quoted in footnote 8, S1tpra, page 781,
and gave instructions which erroneously assume that a "trust
receipt" transaction and a usurious loan are mutually exclusive concepts. 9 In fairness to plaintiff it is pointed out that
9
Such instructions read as follows: ''If the transactions between. the
parties were trust receipt transactions and not loans, then the question
of interest is not involved, and under such circumstances there can be
no claim of usurious or unlawful interest.''
''In determining whether the transactions were loans or whether
they were under trust receipts, you must determine what the transactions were by a consideration of all the evidence, and not merely from
what the parties or documents appear to be or the parties represent
themselves to be.
''It is necessary for you to determine whether the transactions were
loans or were trust receipt transactions:
''If you find as follows: The parties, prior to their later transactions,
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while he made the opening statement, offer of proof, and
request for instruction as shown in footnote 8 and its context,
he did not request the instructions quoted in footnote 9 ;
these latter instructions appear to have been formulated and
given by the court of its own motion. [6] Trust receipts
are "a method of securing a debt and not of creating a debt"
(Commercial Discount Co. v. Los Angeles County (1940),
16 Cal.2d 158, 161 [105 P.2d 115]) ; there can be no such thing
as a security interest which secures no obligation. If Oil City
Motor Co. v. C.I.T. Cm>p. (1935), 76 F.2d 589 [104 .A.L.R.
240], purports to stand for the proposition that trust receipt
transactions cannot be loans within the usury laws, then we
cannot agree with it. As we understand the Oil City case,
however, it is based upon the rule, not applicable here, that
(p. 591 of 76 F.2d) "A return demanded and received for a
understood a.nd agreed that the defendants were to finance the plaintiff
in his husiness . . . , that . . . said agreement was to be carried out;
that in carrying out the same the plaintiff made contact with several
manufacturers in Los Angeles, who understood plaintiff was to be
financed and that later the parties signed the agreements herein admitted in evidence and captioned 'trust receipts'; that in carrying out
their understanding the plaintiff did in all cases but three or four, (in
which three or four cases the money was sent by plaintiff [should read
'' defendm1ts' 'l to tlHJ manufacturers) proceed to Los Angeles with his
truck, or some truck under his control; that he did then order and secure
delivery of various articles, from said manufacturers load the same on
the trucks; and at the same time secure the invoices to the goods; that
the trucks did deliver to his store at Sacramento; that he did at once
take the invoices over to the defendants, and did present the same to
defend;mts, and that the parties did then nnd there sign a document
such as ndmitted in evidenee and designated trust receipt; that in that
document there was a description and price of articles listed therein;
tl1nt defendants did immediately give to the plaintiff a check to cover
the ;mwunt thereof; that it was understood nnd agreed hy the parties
that they wore, and it was the intent of each, that a trust receipt transac·
tion was contemplated; and if you further find that the goods were
placed in plaintiff's store, and that both parties so actecl that thereby
tho goorls were 'floored,' and that both recognized that plaintiff was
irnstee ns elsewhere described herein and did not have title thereto to
rlispose of the same, except under tb e terms of the trust receipt and
that defendants as entrusters had a secm-ity interest, and each party
understood and agreed that the interest of the plaintiff was that of a
trustee, as referred to elsewhere herein, and in the trust agreement;
that when plaintiff delivered the invoices to defendants and received
a check in payment thereof both he, as trustee and defendants as entrusters intended t!Jat a security interest should thereby pass to entrusters
ancl the check so given or money represented thereby was to be applied
in payment to tile manufacturers as per said bill of goods, and both
parties tlJCn rrnd tl1ere signed tbe various documents labeled trust receipts; that there waB no understanding or agreement express or implied, other tlwn the above, if yon so find the facts to be, then I instruct
you that it would be your duty to :find that the transactions as between
the parties were trust receipt transactions and not loans.''
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bona fide loan or extension of credit as distinguished from a
loan of money does not taint the transaction with usury
regardless of the amount . . . if the transaction is in good
faith and not a mere . . . device to conceal usury."
We pass over the question as to whether plaintiff should
be foreclosed, because, it may be argued, he induced the
erroneous view, from raising the contention that the giving
of the instructions quoted in footnote 9 was error, and we
consider the contention on its merits. [7, 8] We recognize
that such instructions are clearly erroneous to the extent
that they imply that trust receipt transactions and loans are,
respectively, inherently and necessarily exclusive each of the
other, and to the extent that they advised the jury that "I£
the transactions . . . were trust receipt transactions and not
loans, then the question of interest is not involved"; nevertheless, if all the instructions are read together, in the light
of the evidence, it appears that the error could not reasonably,
and plaintiff upon whom as appellant the burden rests has
not shown that it did, result in miscarriage of justice. It is
obvious that in fact and in law loans were made, else there
would have been no obligations for the trust receipts to secure,
and it is equally obvious that documents in the form of trust
receipts were used to evidence a security interest which, if
the transactions were bona fide, was created.
The error in the instructions quoted at length in footnote 9 lies in the statement that "If the transactions . . .
were trust receipt transactions and not loans, then the question of interest is not involved, and under such circumstances
there can be no claim of usurious or unlawful interest'' ; in
the statement that "In determining whether the transactions
were loans or whether they were under trust receipts, you
must,'' etc. ; and in the statement that ''It is necessary for
you to determine whether the transactions were loans or were
trust receipt transactions.'' But in the lengthy substance of
the instructions in question, after the opening paragraphs,
the court implicitly predicates applicability of such instructions upon the condition ''If you find as follows : '' and then
details facts which must be found if the subject instructions
are to be given effect. Such facts all go to the question of
good faith and substantiality in the use of the trust receipts,
not to conceal a device for securing usurious interest, bnt to
evidence a security interest in, and exclusively in, a bona fide
flooring transaction in which legitimate charges other than
for interest could be made. To this effect such instructions

a
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particularly specified as conditions (which must have been
found to exist before the instructions would have been applicable) that it was agreed "that the defendants were to finance
the plaintiff in his business" (not merely to loan money for
interest to a going concern with established business and
credit); that the furniture was actually bought from "several
manufacturers in Los Angeles, who understood plaintiff was
to be financed"; that the furniture so purchased was placed
in plaintiff's store; that plaintiff "did at once take the invoices over to the defendants . . . and that the parties did
then and there sign a document . . . designated trust receipt; . . . that defendants did immediately give to the plaintiff a check to cover the amount thereof; that it was understood and agreed by the parties that they were, and it was
the intent of each, that a trust receipt transaction was contemplated; and if you further find that the goods were placed
in plaintiff's store, and that both parties so acted that thereby ·
the goods were 'floored,' and that both recognized that plaintiff was trustee . . . and did not have title thereto to dispose
of the same, except under the terms of the trust receipt and
that defendants as entrusters had a security interest, and
each party understood and agreed that the interest of the
plaintiff was that of a trustee, as referred to . . . in the trust
agreement; . . . that there was no understanding or agreement express or irnplied, other than the above, if you so find
the facts to be, then I instruct you that it would be your duty
to find that the transactions as between the parties were trust
receipt transactions and not loans." (Italics added.) Obviously it was error to give an instruction, standing alone, that
if the transactions were trust receipt transactions they were
not loans, but it is also obvious that applicability of that
instruction was conditioned on the jury's finding that the
trust receipt transactions were bona fide and to secure flooring of the furniture and not to conceal or secure any hidden
agreement for the mere payment of interest.
Furthermore, the erroneous statements are to be considered in the light of other instructions given, hereinafter
quoted. The jury were told that they must consider the instructions as a whole. So considered, the instructions make
it clear that the ultimate issue actually to be decided was not
whether the transactions were trust receipts or loans; that
it was whether the loans, or the transactions by whatever
name they might be called, were or were not usurious. The
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jury were told what a loan is 10 and under the undisputed evidence, as already indicated, it would seem that they must
have found that there were loans here. Trust receipts were
partially explained to them, by quotations from the Uniform
'l'rust Receipts Law, in such a manner that, in the light of
the evidence, it would seem that they must have found, as
likewise already indicated, that there were trust receipts here.
Moreover, the jury were told to look to all the circumstances
in determining whether there was a usurious charge of interest.
Following are the instructions to this effect which were
given at plaintiff's request : ''A contract or agreement involving a loan of money may be verbal or in writing, and
the promise or obligation to repay or return the money may be
secured or unsecured. The form of instrument by which a
borrower hypothecates or puts up property to secure the repayment of the money borrowed does not in and of itself
change what is in fact a loan of money into something else.
Such instrument may be in form a mortgage contract, a pledge
contract, a trust receipt contract ritalics added] or any one
of a number of other writings made to secure the obligation,
and you are instructed that if from all the circumstances
surrounding the transactions occurring between plaintiff and
defendants you find that the transactions were in fact loans
of money, then any such instrument or instruments purporting to transfer an interest in property solely for the purpose
of securing repayment of the money borrowed does not change
what in fact was a loan of money into some other form of obligation. In other words, once a loan of money is made, any
instrument executed or given to secure repayment of that
loan of money does not change or destroy the fact that a
loan of money was made in the original instance.''
''The intent with which the usurv is committed is immaterial, for the voluntary taking of m~re than the legal rate of
interest constitutes nsury. Therefore the only intent necessary on the part of the lender is the intent to take more
interest than the law permits. Usurious intent is implied if
excessive interest is intentionally taken, and it is of no consequence that there was no specific intent knowingly to violate the usury law.
10
The following instruction was given: ''A loan of money is the delivery of a sum of money to another under a contract to return at some
future time an equivalent amount with or without nn additional sum
ngreed upon for its use.'' This definition is materially similar to the
definition in the Civil Code ( § 1912).
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''However where clifferent transactions have been entered
into and these different transactions are relied upon in making a charge of usury all the circumstances must be inquired
into to determine whether or not such collateral agreement,
or separate agreement 1vas intended to be and was a part
of another agreement, and considering the two together there
was a usurious charge of interest. . . . Under such circumstances the question is IYhether there was an intent to evade
the law with regard to usury, and all the circumstances may
be considered in the determination of such question. The
burden rests upon the one charging usury to establish such
charge.''
In the light of these instructions it would be attributing
to the jury folly; or disregard of the charge to consider the
instructions as a whole, to assume that they thought that the
lengthy trial was had in order to determine whether the relationship of plaintiff and the finance company was that of
borrower and lender or that of trustee and entruster (when
it 'Was undisputably both), rather than to determine whether
the lomB :oenued by the trust rcPeipts were usurious. It
is dear-or at the very least plaintiff has failed to sustain
the burden of showing convincing evidence to the contrarythat the jury rejected plaintiff's contention that the finance
\"ompany charged usurious interest because it is apparent from
plaintiff's testimony as a whole that he first conceived the
notion that the transactions vvere illeg'al when he decided
upon this action as a method of recouping his failing fortunes11 after he defaulted on a payment due to the finance
company.
[9] Plaintiff also complains of the giving of the following instruction : ''A lender is not prohibited from charging·
an extra and reasonable amount for incidental services, expenses or risk additional to the lawful interest, other than
for the loan of money. He may make a reasonable charge for
investigating, arranging, negotiating, brokering, making, servicing, collecting and enforcing his obligation.
''Such items, however, must be confined to specific service
or expense incidental to the loan incurred in such a way as
11
A statement covering plaintiff's business during the period from
July 7, 1946, to December 27, 1946 (on the latter date, as hereinafter
described. defendants took possession of the furniture because of plaintiff's default in payments), shows "liabilities owing" in the amount of
$21,829.67; under assets, ''cash on hand in bank was a minus $39.85,''
and "Mr. Klett's capital was a deficit, $2,712.26."
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to preclude it being a device through which additional interest
or profit on the loan may be exacted.''
This instruction, given at defendants' request, is a correct
statement of the law (In re F~~ller ( 1940), 15 Cal.2d 425, 433,
434 [102 P.2d 321]; see Haines v. Commercial Mortgage Co.
(1927), 200 Cal. 609, 616 [254 P. 956, 255 P. 805, 53 A.L.R.
725], pointing out that a general charge for "expenses" or
''services'' not attributable to any particular expense or service may well be but a device to evade the usury law). Plaintiff
asserts that the instruction conflicts with the provision of
section 22 of article XX of the California Constitution that
"No person . . . or corporation shall by charging any fee,
bonus, commission, discount or other compensation receive
from a borrower more than ten per cent per annum upon
any loan or forbearance of any money . . . '' [10] Legitimate
charges for specific items of actual service and expense are
not, as plaintiff seems to believe, compensation for the loan
of money; i. e., such charges are not interest; and the statement in Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co. (1949), 33 Cal.2d
564, 579 [203 P.2d 758], that the quoted constitutional provision was intended ''to prevent lenders from circumventing the
limits on interest . . . by forbidding any charges whereby
the borrower is required to pay more than the 10 per cent,''
does not mean that charges which are not interest become
interest by reason of the constitutional amendment.
[11] There was received in evidence, over plaintiff's objection, the statement of trust receipt financing which, under section 3016.9 of the Civil Code, may be filed by an entruster with
the Secretary of State. The statement was merely some evidence that the finance company intended to lend money to
plaintiff on the security of trust receipts. Its admission could
not have prejudiced plaintiff. He, himself, proved the fact.

The Conversion Cause of Action
On December 16, 1946, after defendants had been financing
plaintiff under the '' tr~st receipt'' arrangement for about
a year, plaintiff issued to defendants his check for the amount
due under one of the ''trust receipts'' which covered furniture
which had been sold by plaintiff to a retail customer. The
check was not honored because there were insufficient funds
in plaintiff's bank account. Also at this time plaintiff, in
violation of the terms of ''trust receipts,'' had not turned over
to defendants the proceeds of sales of certain other furniture
which was covered by such "trust receipts." The due dates
on the other ''trust receipts'' covering the furniture in plain-
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tiff's store had passed. After the check was dishonored defendant Forrest made several oral demands that plaintiff make
good the check, and that he pay the entire amount due to the
finance company (about $7,030) or surrender possession of
the entrusted furniture. Plaintiff stated that he had no money
with which to pay the finance company. On December 27,
1946, Forrest, as he had told plaintiff he would do, came
to plaintiff's store and took all the furniture which was covered by ''trust receipts''; Forrest also took other furniture,
not covered by ''trust receipts,'' of a value equal to that of
the furniture which plaintiff had improperly sold without
delivering the proceeds.
The complaint on which the case was tried alleges that
defendants on December 27, 1946, converted, took, and carried
away the furniture; that plaintiff thereafter demanded and
defendants refused return of such furniture; and, upon information and belief, that defendants subsequently sold the
furniture.
The jury, adequately instructed, 12 impliedly found upon
sufficient evidence 13 that plaintiff consented to the taking of
the furniture on December 27. [12] Since plaintiff consented to the taking of the furniture, that taking was not a
conversion, and the following contentions of plaintiff (together
with related contentions concerning the instructions) are
12
The jury were told that ''in a legal sense the word 'consent' means
capable, deliberate, free and voluntary assent or agreement to, or concurrence in, some act or purpose, implying physical and mutual power and
free action which is unclouded by threats, or duress. It presupposes
that the person to be affected has knowledge of his rights. If, therefore,
consent is given or obtained by means of unwarranted threats, or is
given by a person without full knowledge of his rights, such a consent
has no force or effect whatsoever, and the legal effect of consent given
under such circumstances is the same as though no consent were given'';
that "he who consents to an act is not wronged by it"; and that "If
you believe that when the defendants called upon plaintiff to surrender
the merchandise which was then in plaintiff's possession, the plaintiff
did not dispute defendants' right to the goods, or set up a claim to
them against the defendants, but freely consented thereto, then the
defendants committed no conversion.''
13
After Forrest had demanded that plaintiff pay the amount due the
finance company or surrender the furniture, and plaintiff had told
Forrest that he could not pay, Forrest told plaintiff that on the morning
of the 27th he (Forrest) would come to plaintiff's store to take the
furniture. On that morning plaintiff went to the store with Forrest.
Plaintiff told an employe that Forrest "has come for the furniture and
is going to take it out of the store and we are going to turn it over
to him,'' and directed the employe to turn over to Forrest certain furniture not covered by "trust receipts" in place of furniture which plaintiff had improperly sold without delivering the proceeds of the sales to
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without merit: that Forrest improperly took some furniture
which plaintiff had already sold to retail purchasers; that
plaintiff was not in default (because of a waiver of default)
and therefore defendants could not sell the furniture without
notice to plaintiff; that because defendants were not licensed
under the Personal Property Brokers Act (Stats. 1909, p. 969,
as amended; 2 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 5825 (2d) 14 ) the
loans were void ( § 21) and therefore the sale of the furniture
in which the finance company had only a purported security
interest amounted to a conversion.
[13] Furthermore, the Personal Property Brokers Act had
no application. The act did not apply to "bona fide conditional contracts of sale involving the disposition of personal
property, when such forms of sales agreements are not used
for the purpose of evading this act'' ( § 4, par. (c)), and ''As
used in this act the term 'conditional contracts of sale' shall
include flooring contracts" ( § 3). The security transactions
here, although not conditional sales contracts in the usual sense
of the term, are "flooring contracts" within the meaning of
the act and within the definition of ''flooring contracts''
accepted by plaintiff; hence they are included within the definition ( § 3 of the act) of conditional contracts of sale. (See
plaintiff's instruction quoted sttpm, footnote 1; Commercial
Credit Co. v. Barney JYI. Co. (1938), 10 Cal.2d 718, 720 [76
P.2d 1181] .)
Plaintiff complains that an objection to the following
question addressed to him was sustained: ''Now, assuming
he [Forrest] did not have a right to remove that furniture,
would you have consented to his taking any of the furniture~''
Framed as it was, the question required plaintiff to speculate
on what his action would have been. If plaintiff wished to
adduce testimony as to his state of mind he could have testified
to it directly rather than speculatively.
[14] Certain evidence offered by plaintiff to prove the
extent of his damages was rejected. Since the jury found
against plaintiff on the issue of liability and did not reach
defendants. At the time Forrest was taking the furniture plaintiff asked
Forrest to hold it for him because plaintiff believed he might he able
to raise some money; l~orrest replied that he would hold it for five days;
and plaintiff stated that that was satisfactory. Thereafter plaintiff did
not communicate with defendants concerning the furniture. Defendants
held it for more than five days and then, without notice to plaintiff, sold
it for about $6,:)00 and applied this sum to the cancellation of plaintiff's
deht; nl1ont $.130 remained owing fTom plaintiff to the finance company.
14
Provisions based upon this act arc now found in the Financial Code,
~

22000 et seq.
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the issue of damages, plaintiff cannot now complain of the
rejection of the evidence as to extent of damages.
[15] Pinally, plaintiff asserts that the jury were out too
short a time to have properly deliberated. '!.'hey retired at
11 :10 a.m. and returned 25 minutes later with a signed
separate verdict o·n each of the two counts. The jury were
polled and, with the exception of one juror as to count 2,
the verdicts for defendants were unanimous. vV e cannot
conclude from this circumstance, either standing alone or in
the light of the entire record, that there is reasonable ground
for concluding that there has been a miscarriage of justice;
accordingly the verdicts must be upheld. (Cal. Const., art.
VI,§ 4%.)
For the reasons above stated the judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., 'l.'raynor, J., and Spence, J., eoncurred.
Edmonds, J ., concurred in the judgment.
CAHTEH, J.-I dissent.
The main issue presented in this case was whether the
transaction between plaintiff and defendants was usurious.
The transaction was in the form of trust receipts and the
court erroneously instructed the jury, as is conceded by the
majority opinion, that a trust receipt transaction can never
be usurious and if it was found to be such an arrangement in
this case, defendants must recover. Yet it is held that there
was no prejudice-that the jury was not misled. I think it
is clear that the majority opinion itself demonstrates that
the jury was misled. The parties and the trial court were
confused as to the law on the subject and hence the erroneous
instructions were given. How then may it be said the jury
was not confused f
'l'urning to the law involved, it appeared that the trust
receipt instruments were between plaintiff-dealer, as trustee,
and the company-financier, as entruster, and provided that the
trustee "holds in trust" for the entruster, "as security for
payment of the amount hereinafter set forth on the due date
hereinafter specified,'' the described furniture, ''in which personal property a security interest remains in or is hereby
transferred to Entruster as security for such payment. Trustee agrees to hold said personal property in trust as the property of Entruster for the purpose of sale or exchange and to
deliver same to the Entruster upon demand. Entruster may
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at any time examine said personal property and the books
and records of the Trustee with reference thereto and may
at any time either before or after the due date repossess said
personal property without notice or demand of any kind
and for such purpose Entruster or his representatives may
without legal process enter any premises in which said personal
property is located. Entruster may insure said personal
property against the hazards of fire and theft while held by the
Trustee for not less than the amount secured hereby, and the
Trustee agrees to pay the premiums and charges for such insurance to Entruster upon demand and until so paid same
shall likewise be secured hereby.
''. . . The Trustee may, however, sell said personal property for cash or on terms approved in advance by Entruster
for not less than the amount due Entruster hereunder, including insurance premiums and charges; provided, however,
that upon such sale all moneys hereby secured shall become
immediately due and payable and all of the proceeds and considerations received in such sale shall be forthwith delivered
to Entruster as security for payment of said moneys and
until so delivered shall be held by the Trustee separate from
the funds of the Trustee and as security for such payment."
The articles of furniture are described and an amount named
"Amt. Secured" is set opposite each, together with the clue
elate. On repossession of the property by the entruster it
may sell it and apply the proceeds to the expenses of the sale
and "to the satisfaction of the Trustee's indebtedness hereby
secured; and, fourth, to the payment of any other obligation
owed by Trustee to Entruster. The Trustee shall receive
any surplus and shall pay into Entruster upon demand any
deficiency. . . .
''In the event of default by the Trustee in the payment
of any moneys hereunder due on the due elate hereof, Entruster may declare all moneys secured immediately clue and
payable. In event of such default Entruster may at his
option and in lieu of sale as hereinabove provided declare a
forfeiture of the Trustee's interest in said personal property
against cancellation of the then remaining indebtedness in
accordance with the provisions of Section 3016.2 of the Civil
Code of the State of California.''
It is quite clear that the transactions were standard trust
receipt arrangements as they are established by the Uniform
Trust Receipts Law. (Civ. Code, §§ 3012-3016.16.) That
law defines an entruster as one who has directly or by agent
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taken a ''security interest'' in goods under a trust receipt
transaction, but does not include a person who owns goods
and sells them on conditional sale for profit. ( Civ. Code,
§ 3013 [3] .) A "security interest" is a property interest in
goods limited "to securing performance of some obligation
of the trustee." (Id., §3013[12].) A "trustee" is a person
"having or taking" possession of goods under a trust receipt
transaction. (Id., § 3013[14].) "New value," includes new
''advances or loans'' made, but not extensions or renewals
of existing obligations of the trustee. (Id., § 3013 [7].) A
trust receipt transaction is any transaction where the entruster
and trustee are parties for one of the purposes mentioned
in the section (that is, applicable here, where the possession
of the goods by the trustee is for the purpose of selling them
[Id., §3014(1)(3)(a)]), whereby "(a) The entruster or
any third person delivers to the trustee goods . . . in which the
entruster (i) prior to the transaction has, or for new value
( ii) by the transaction acquires or (iii) as the result thereof
is to acquire promptly, a security interest . . . provided, that
the delivery under paragraph (a) . . . either (i) Be against
the signing and delivery by the trustee of a writing designating
the goods . . . concerned, and reciting that a security interest
therein remains in or will remain in, or has passed to or will
pass to, the entruster . . . . " (Id., § 3014[1] [a] [b] [i].) The
security interest of the entruster may be derived from the
trustee or from any other person. (Id., § 3014[1].) Under
the initial oral agreement here, the method by which the
transactions were handled, we have at least a situation where
the purpose of the arrangement was to enable plaintiff-trustee
to have possession of the goods for retail sale ; defendant company-entruster acquired its security interest from the plaintifftrustee; the goods were delivered to the trustee by a third
person, the factory-seller and the entruster "by the transaction is to acquire promptly'' a security interest. The trust
receipts declaring the security interest in the entruster were
executed immediately after the trustee obtained possession
of the goods from the seller in conformity with the prior oral
understanding. The entruster gave new value, that is, the
payment of 90 per cent of the cost of the goods. We do not
read the uniform law as requiring that title pass to the
entruster from the seller-factory, that is, that a tripartite
arrangement is required between the seller, retail dealer and
financier. As long as it is a part of the same transaction,
and the steps are in close proximity, we have a trust receipt.
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Here the advancements were made to enable the dealer-trustee
to buy from the seller and the advances were to be secured
by trust receipts. All according to an oral understanding,
and promptly upon delivery of the goods by the seller to the
trustee, the advancements were made, the seller was paid, and
a trust receipt executed which vested a security interest in the
entruster. It is true that a trust receipt under the uniform
law is not a negotiable promissory note, for it is not an
unconditional promise to pay a sum certain. It is a method
of ''securing a debt and not creating a debt.'' Nor is it a
chattel mortgage or conditional sale. ( Cornrner·cial Discmlnt
Co. v. Los Angeles Cmtnty, 16 Cal.2d 158 [105 P.2d 115] ;
Chichester· v. Commercial Credit Co., 87 Cal.App.2d 489 [99
P .2d 1088] . ) Nevertheless, the transaction is a security
transaction. As said in Cornnwr·cial Discount Co. v. Los Angeles
County, supra, 16 Cal.2d 158, 161, after stating that a trust
receipt is a method of securing a ''debt'' not creating a
"debt": "There is nothing in the law which would prevent
the execution of a promissory note or notes representing the
amounts secured by the trust receipts. It does not appear that
the plaintiff took notes from the automobile dealers for that
purpose and the case is presented on the theory that the
obligations to repay the money loaned rested in parol.'' In
Chichester v. Cornmm·cr·az Credit Co., supra, 87 Cal.App.2d
439, the order for cars ~was placed by the retail dealer with
the factory-seller and the financier paid the seller for them
and they were shipped, the bills of lading going to the
financier who turned them over to the dealer on his signing
a trust receipt and he then got possession of them. \Vhile
that was a tripartite transaction, the court said (p. 448) :
''Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Trust Receipts Law,
the only instance where the security title of a trust receipt
holder was permitted to prevail against the claims of creditors of the trustee or against his trustee in bankruptcy, was
where the title of the entruster or trust receipt holder was
derived from someone other than the trustee. (Ar·ena v. Bank
of Italy, 194 Cal. 195 [228 P. 441]; In re James, Inc., supra
[30 F.2d 555]; In re Fonntain, 282 F. 816 [25 A.L.R. 319] .)
\Vhere the title of the entruster was derived from the trustee
and not from some third person, the transaction was treated as
being similar to a chattel mortgage and was held to be void
as against creditors of the trustee in the absence of recordation . (Arena v. Bank of Italy, supra.)
''If in the instant case defendant held the title to the
automobiles at all times, as was found by the court, deriving
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such title directly from the Chrysler Corporation, its security
interest would be protected under the former law as well as
under section 3016.4 of the Civil Code. The evidence discloses
with respect to the Chrysler automobiles that although they
were shipped by the Chrysler Corporation directly to Reagan,
accompanied by invoices made out to Reagan, the bills of
lading were made out to, and were sent directly to defendant.
The evidence is conflicting as to whether sight drafts were
attached to all of such bills of lading, but it appears without
controversy that in every instance, whether by paying such
drafts, or by other arrangements, defendant paid the full
purchase price for such automobiles directly to the Chrysler
Corporation. Moreover, defendant paid all of the freight
charges. 'rhe bills of lading were not delivered to Reagan
until after the trust receipts had been signed. Concerning
the Plymouth automobiles which were delivered from the Los
Angeles office of the Chrysler Corporation, defendant after
securing trust receipts from Reagan, ordered the cars to be
delivered to Reagan's place of business and paid the purchase
price directly to the corporation. There is no evidence whatever tending to prove that Reagan at any time prior to signing
the trust receipts, had either title to or possession of any of
the automobiles in question. Although the trial court found
that defendant was at all times the owner of the automobiles
in question, it was of no consequence whether defendant's title
originated with the Chr·ysler Cor·poration or wr:th Reagan.
"Plaintiff places great reliance upon the case of Arena v.
Bank of Italy, snpra, in support of his contention that a trust
receipt which does not comply with the provisions of section
3440 of the Civil Code is void as against creditors of the
trustee. That decision, however, is clearly distinguishable
upon its facts from the instant case. It must be borne in
mind that the Arena case was decided long prior to the enactment of the Uniform Trust Receipts Law. In the Arena case,
one Dellaira having both the title and possession of certain
g·oods, assigned and delivered possession of such goods to the
Bank of Italy as security for an indebtedness ; thereafter the
bank restored the possession of such goods to Dellaira and,
at the same time took the trust receipts in question from
Dellaira. Obviously, whatever title or interest the bank acquired could only have been derived from Dellaira, the
trustee under the trust receipts. The court properly held
that under the law which existed at that time, i.e., prior to
the enactment of the Uniform Trust Receipts Law, the trans-
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action was to be treated as being in the nature of a chattel
mortgage and consequently void as against the trustee's
(debtor's) creditors unless properly recorded.
''From the foregoing discussion it appears that under the
former law the source of the entruster's title was the controlling factor in determining whether or not a given trust
receipt transaction was valid. However, under the existing
law, by which the instant case is to be governed, the entruster's security interest will be protected whether his title
is derived from the trustee or from a third party. From an
examination of section 3014 of the Civil Code, which defines
trust receipt transactions, it is apparent that the legislature
intended to include within the general provisions of the law
all trust receipt transactions without regard to the source of
the entruster's title. That section provides, among other
things: 'The security interest of the entruster may be derived
from the tntstee or from any other person, and by pledge or
by transfer of title or otherwise.'
''The only case which has come to our attention, involving
an interpretation of the California Uniform Trust Receipts
Law, is In re Boswell, 20 F.Supp. 748, affirmed in 96 F.2d
239. The facts of that case were similar to those of the Arena
case in that the entruster derived its title from the trustee who
had both possession and title to the merchandise covered by
the trust receipt. Thereafter the trustee became bankrupt
and action was brought by the entruster to reclaim the merchandise from the trustee in bankruptcy. It was held that
under the sections of the Civil Code comprising the Uniform
Trust Receipts Law, such a transaction was valid and enforceable and that the entruster was entitled to reclaim the merchandise in question from the trustee in bankruptcy." In re
Boswell, 20 F.Supp. 748, affirmed 96 F.2d 239, approved in the
Chichester case, involved a situation where the retail dealer
bought the merchandise on open account from the sellerfactory and title passed to him and the bank-financier advanced $800 to pay for it and took notes representing the
amount and a trust receipt as security. In In re Chappell,
77 F'.Supp. 573, 575, it is said: "In order to constitute a
trust receipt transaction under the Oregon Uniform Trust
Receipts Law the entruster bank must acquire its security
interest prior to or at the same time as delivery is made to
the dealer, or delivery must be made under some arrangement
whereby the security interest is to be acquired 'promptly.'
Section 75-102, O.C.L.A. In other words, the delivery of the
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goods to the dealer must stem from an arrangement between
the bank and the dealer for the acquisition of the goods by
means of advances from the bank." (See, also, Automobile
Banking Corp. v. Weicht, 160 Pa. Super. 422 [51 A.2d 409] ;
Peoples Finance & Thrift Co. v. Bowman, 58 Cal.App.2d 729
[137 P.2d 729]; Universal Credit Co. v. Citizens State Bank
of Petersburg, 224 Ind. 1 [64 N.E.2d 28, 168 A.L.R. 352] ;
57 Yale L.J., 761; 5 Fordham L.Rev., 17, 240; 16 Wash.
L.Rev. 1, 10; 41 Colo.L.Rev., 1134; 3 Univ. of Chicago L.Rev.,
26.) Plaintiff seeks to distinguish the Chichester case on the
ground that there was at the time that case arose a subdivision
(c) to subdivision ( 1) of section 3014, which read : ". . . or
(c) the en truster gives new value in reliance upon the transfer
by the trustee to such entruster of a security interest in goods
or documents in possession of the trustee and the possession
of which is retained by the trustee . . . '' which subdivision
was later eliminated by amendment ( Stats. 1939, p. 2826),
and a special provision was added for the protection of motor
vehicle and a,ircraft dealers, reading: ''A trust receipt transaction is also one in which, pursuant to a trust receipt, a motor
vehicle dealer or aircraft dealer as trustee obtains new value
from an entruster upon the transfer to the latter of a security
interest in new or used motor vehicles or aircraft, whether or
not such vehicles or aircraft are owned or possessed by the
trustee prior or subsequent to the execution of the trust receipt document, and whether or not such vehicles or aircraft
are thereafter retained in the trustee's possession.
"All of the provisions of this chapter which are applicable
to the trust receipt transactions enumerated in Section 3014
are applicable to the trust receipt transaction specified in
this section." ( Civ. Code, § 3014.5.) But the Chichester
case was not based on said subdivision (c) as seen from the
quotation therefrom, supra. The transaction here concerned,
falls within subdivision (a) of subdivision (1) and the next
to last paragraph in subdivision ( 1). The special provision
for motor vehicles and aircraft deals with cases where the
dealer has possession of the goods prior to and wholly independent of the trust receipt. There is no relation between
his possession and the trust receipt. Here the whole thing was
a part of a continuous transaction.
As plaintiff's first cause of action is for allegedly usnrious
interest, defendants urge that there could be no such interest
for the reason that "trust receipts" are not subject to the
usury law (Cal. Const., art. XX, § 22; Stats. 1919, p. lxxxiii),
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as they are not a loan or forbearance of money. We find
nothing in the trust receipts law that exempts such transactions from the usury law. As above seen they are a sui generis
type of secu1·ity transaction, somewhat like a chattel mortgage, pledge or conditional sales contract, but different from
any of them. The fact remq,ins that the transaction is a
method by which the performance of some financial obligation is secnred, the same as is true of other security arrangements such as chattel mortgages. Being only the security
instrument, like a chattel mortgage, accurately speaking, it is
not the loam:ng instrument-or one containing the promise
to pay or do some other act. Such features are usually found
in promissory notes or collateral promises to perform. In
trust receipts the main purpose is to assure the entruster that
he will be repaid the money advancements he has made to
enable the trustee-dealer to obtain possession of and sell
merchandise. He may be in the position of a lender to the
dealer-borrower. The obligation or promise for which the
trust receipt is given, must be examined to determine whether
there has been a loan or forbearance and whether the interest
is too high. In Oil City Motor Co. v. C. I. T. Corp., 76 F.2d
589 [104 A.L.R. 240], the finance company paid the price
of the cars to the seller and they were then shipped to the
dealer and the latter gave a trust receipt to the company,
thus enabling the dealer to obtain the cars with the instruments of title. If that case purports to stand for the proposition that such transactions may never be loans within the
usury laws, we cannot agree with it. It is based upon the
proposition that a sale or loan of credit is not a loan of money
and therefore not within the usury law, a principle which is
subject to the qualification that such a device may not be used
as a cloak for usury. It has been said: "It is well settled that
the usury law is inapplicable to a transaction amounting
merely to a loan or sale of credit, and a loan of money, to
facilitate which a loan of credit is made, is not rendered
usurious by the payment of, or agreement to pay, a sum
exacted for the loan of the credit. However, it is difficult
to lay down any general rule as to what amounts to a sale
of credit as difltinguishec1 from a loan. Although the transaction must not be a mere cover for usury, and in the decision
of this question the intellt of the parties is important, generally speaking, consideration must be given to the particular
facts in order to determine whether one of the parties to the
transaction is to advance money, or whether the advance is
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to be made in the first instance by a third party. If, for instance, the transaction is one not contemplating· the immediate
advance of money by a party thereto, but merely a means of
enabling one of the parties to procure funds from a third
party, it is properly deemed a sale of credit, as regards the
usury statutes, although eventually the party permitting the
use of his credit has to advance the money before he is placed
in funds or property by the one receiving the credit." (55
Am.Jur., Usury, § 25.) The most common and clear instance
of its application is where a person guarantees payment by
the maker of a promissory note. (See 104 A.L.R. 245.)
Where, however, as a part of the transaction, the lender in
fact advances the money to purchase the merchandise for
the dealer, with an express or implied promise to repay the
mon~y, together with what qualifies as interest under the
usury law, there may be a loan of money. (See Osborne v.
Fuller, 92 S.C. 338 [75 S.E. 557, 42 L.R.A.N.S. 1058]; Wood
v. Angeles JJlesa Land Co., 120 Oal.App. 313 [7 P.2d 748] .)
An issue to be determined, therefore, is whether the basic
transaction constituted a loan or forbearance within the meaning of the usury law.
'rhe majority opinion says that the case is not a close one;
that the instructions permitted the jury to find the transactions were trust reeeipts and yet loans, for it eould find that
the trust receipts were bona fide and to seeure floort"ng of the
furniture and not an agreement for interest, that is, in effect,
that if they were flooring contracts, there was no usury. Not
only is that not true but the majority concedes it is not, later
in the opinion, where it is said : ''The security transactions
here, although not conditional sales contracts in the usual
s<:>nse of the term, are 'flooring contracts' within the meaning
of the aet and within the definition of 'flooring contracts'
aecepted by plaintiff." But, obviously, flooring eontracts are
the same as trust receipts. The ultimate holding is therefore
that flooring eontracts-trust receipts-are not subject to
the usury laws.
As I have pointed out, the case was a close one. Indeed
the evidence is overwhelming that the transactions were loans
for which interest was charged which exceeded the legal limit.
There is evidence from which it may be inferred that the
transaction was a loan of money rather than a loan or sale
of credit, or any other transaction, such as the actual advance of the money to either plaintiff or the manufacturer,
carrying with it an implied promise to repay together with
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1 per cent per month. The trust receipt refers to an "indebtedness" for which it stands as security; that a "security
interest'' is transferred to the en truster-defendant, thus negating a sale of the property. In some of defendants' accounts
the 1 per cent item has the letters "Int." after them, indicating interest. Defendants are in the lending and financing
business, not the retail furniture business. Defendants' explanation of the arrangement with plaintiff is weak and conclusionary, barely sufficient to create a conflict in the evidence.
Kenneth Forrest, one of the officials, testified that it was for
trust receipts and plaintiff Klett ''asked me or rather told
me he had been in the furniture business for approximately
thirty years ; that he understood it very thoroughly; he was
forming a partnership with a Mr. Raymond Parker and Mr.
Parker was going to put up $7500.00 and he was going to put
up his ability and they were going to start a furniture store
on the Davis Highway and Mr. Parker at that time had not
put up all his money and he had only put up, if I remember
correctly, around $2000.00 or $2500.00 and that he would like
to find some way to have furniture placed in his store and asked
me if I would be able to do his financing for him and I told him
it was impossible for me to finance any furniture because it
did not have a serial number on it, that if he would like to
floor his merchandise such as appliances that I would be glad
to do it for him and he told me that I had known him for
considerable time and he would be glad to place a serial number
on each individual piece of furniture and under those circumstances would I floor merchandise for him and I told him,
after some conversation back and forth regarding his experience, I told him I would do it and I told him when I would
be able to do it under trust receipts, that I would send the
checks direct to the factory on each particular deal and that
he would put up 10 per cent and I would charge him 1 per
cent a month and at that time he stated he had some furniture
in Sacramento already, I asked him, is it paid for and he said
it was and I told him that we would purchase the furniture in
Sacramento on trust receipts and pay him 90 per cent of that
and charge him 1 per cent of that also . . . and, about that
time, he asked me if I would also handle his contracts and I
told him that I would be glad to purchase his contracts but
that I would have to buy them non-recourse as we didn't have
a loan license and it would be necessary that we buy the contracts non-recourse and that our charge for purchasing them
was approximately 17 per cent and he said that was perfectly
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satisfactory, that he would be glad to do business with us on
that basis . . . Mr. Klett asked me if I would be able to
finance about $5,000 and I told him that we would, in fact,
we stipulated at that time we wouldn't go over $5,000." In
regard to the 1 per cent per month charge, Forrest testified:
'' Q. What was that 1 per cent for, Mr. Forrest f A. The
charge of enabling him to have our furniture in his store and
other consideration. Q. ·would that be for, let us say, writing
up the trust receipt and handling the invoice and s.uch as
that? A. Yes, sir, that would include writing up the trust
receipt, the bookkeeper's time, making up a ledger card and
putting it in the books and making up the addressograph
plate to enable us to send the notices, and the notices themselves and the mail. . . . Q. And for the ttse of that money
ymt made a charge of 1 per cent, is that correct? A. For the
privilege of his having my furniture in his store I charged him
1 per cent a month. Q. For the privilege of his having your
furniture in h1:s store you charged him 1 per cent a month.
A. That is right. Q. And is that 1 per cent-considerable
of that 1 per cent, as you have testified, went into certain
expenses? A. That is right. Q. Do you know how much of
the 1 per cent went into actual expenses? A. Roughly, I
would say about Y2 of 1 per cent. Q. That is about half of
it? A. The other half, I would say, was profit." In other
words the deal was to be by trust receipts and was to enable
plaintiff to have furniture in his store-to finance him-to
loan him money.
It will be noted that frequent references are made to trust
receipts. Both parties agreed that instruments called trust
receipts were used. A notice that they were engaged in trust
receipt transactions was filed with the Secretary of State
as required by law. ( Civ. Code, § 3016.9.) The trust receipts,
labelled by that name, were introduced into evidence. With
everyth1:ng pointing to a trust receipt arrangement and nothing to the contrary, the jury was told that if it was a trust
receipt deal there was no usury-defendant could not recover. I fail to see how the jury could escape being misled
to the prejudice of plaintiff. The parties and the evidence
told them the arrangement was a trust receipt one and then
as a clincher the court commanded them to hold for defendants
if trust receipts were used. This court said in Sebrell v. Los
Angeles Ry. Corp., 31 Cal.2d 813, 817 [192 P .2d 898] : "Instructions that are contradictory in essential elements may
38 C.2d-26
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warrant the reversal of a judgment on the ground that it cannot be ascertained whieh instruction was followed by the
jury."
[ would therefore reverse the judgment.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 15,
1952. Carter, .J., was of the opinion that the petition should
be granted.
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